Summary: This article examines the history of yellow fever research carried out in West Africa in the 1940s by Rockefeller Foundation scientists. It engages with a number of debates in the history of medical research in colonial Africa, including experimentation, the construction of the "field," and biosecurity.
Over the past thirty years or so, sub-Saharan Africa has been the site of extensive biomedical research and interventions by "global health" institutions. Though there are multiple definitions of "global health," in general this term refers to a combination of initiatives launched in the post-World War II period (but particularly since the 1980s) by actors based outside of the continent, including large philanthropic foundations, international health organizations, bilateral agencies, and public-private partnerships. Alongside these initiatives there has now emerged a considerable literature in medical and social anthropology, science and technology studies, and history analyzing the impact of these initiatives.
1 While acknowledging the very real advances in health outcomes that recent global health investments have made, much of this work is highly critical of the modes of operation of global health institutions-their relative lack of accountability, their technocratic and experimental foci, their biosecurity agendas, and (in some accounts) their implication in the construction of forms of "biopower." Many scholars see "global health" as operating in a kind of "state of exception," exercising a form of semiprivatized governmentality that lies outside the control of African states and their citizens, creating "parastates" and islands of medical research and surveillance in the context of growing health inequalities and crumbling public health systems. 2 There is some disagreement in this literature on the question of continuity or discontinuity between the workings of "global health" and the institutions of colonial and international health that preceded it. As some philanthropic foundations increasingly operate with larger budgets than that of the World Health Organization, it can be argued that we are in a new era of privatized global health, producing "new biopolitical forms" in Africa and a "new vital politics."
3 Others point to greater continuity in international health interventions in Africa in the post-World War II period, 4 or beyond into the late colonial and interwar periods. 5 The current power and influence of global health foundations, such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, also has roots that go much deeper than the late twentieth century, as a number of authors have pointed out. 6 There is a tension in this recent literature between a critique of global health practices as remote, technocratic, and experimental, and a parallel critique of its interventions as excessively intrusive, especially in the area of sexual health, and engaged in the construction of new forms of citizenship and subjectivity. Guillaume Lachenal describes the work of the scientific community of "virus hunters" in Africa as a form of "medical nihilism" characterized by a mixture of scientific hubris and non-intervention (or the "intervention of non-intervention") in the context of failing public health systems. 7 The unfolding of the 2015 West African Ebola epidemic came as a reminder of how sophisticated international medical research on viruses in Africa coexists with catastrophically underresourced public health facilities.
In the light of this literature on global health in Africa, this article examines the history of the Yellow Fever Research Institute at Yaba, near Lagos in Nigeria in the 1940s. It is largely based on the documentation produced by the Rockefeller-funded personnel, supplemented by British Colonial Office papers, and is inevitably limited by that. No doubt there is a much fuller story to be told by historians of science in Nigeria. 8 Though largely funded by the Rockefeller Foundation, the YFRI at Yaba was nevertheless formed by a collaboration with the British colonial authorities, employing British as well as American scientists. I argue that the YFRI demonstrated many of the characteristics of the international research enclave as described by scholars of present-day global health in Africa. Like them, I also argue that the laboratory that formed the heart of this enclave was far from being hermetically sealed-it formed part of a larger experimental field in which technologies were tried out and tested. I am not arguing that the YFRI was in any way typical of scientific or medical research in Africa at the time, but it is a striking precursor to recent examples. Though the scientists of the YFRI were central to a wartime program of vaccine development and supply to Allied troops, for the most part they regarded West Africa as a site for pure research into viruses and were largely disengaged from the pressing needs of public health, which they regarded as the responsibility of the colonial authorities. Scientifically ambitious, sophisticated, and very well funded, the YFRI scientists embarked on a program of research that took them from laboratory to the "field" and thus, inevitably, into a highly unequal engagement with Nigerian (and other West African) communities. By and large this story does not resonate with that told by Helen Tilley of late colonial scientists engaging self-critically with African realities. 9 It is in part a story of postwar scientific optimism and of ambition, but the ambition related more to "pure" research than it did to public health applications. The Rockefeller scientists were optimistic that their research in Africa would result in a significant advance in knowledge of the yellow fever virus, particularly in its endemic form, and to some extent this ambition was fulfilled. Their work in Africa was at the cutting edge of virology, and they could claim to have discovered much about virus behavior that is still relevant today, as recent discussions of the Zika virus have shown.
10
This knowledge had the potential to inform attempts to control the spread of viral disease globally.
11 During and after World War II this may have been given added urgency by biosecurity concerns, particularly over the use of viral agents as biological weapons. Rarely did they attempt to justify their investment in terms of African public health. Indeed, as Heather 9. Helen Tilley, Africa as a Living Laboratory: Empire, Development and Scientific Knowledge, 1870 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011 .
10. Zika is, like yellow fever, a Flavivirus, and its discovery in 1947 is attributed to the Rockefeller-funded researchers of the Yellow Fever Research Institute in Entebbe, Uganda.
11. George K. Strode, et al., eds., Yellow Fever (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1951) ; Kavita Sivaramakrishnan, "Yellow Fever, Quarantine and the Jet Age in India: Extremely Far, Incredibly Close," in Quarantine: Local and Global Histories, ed. Alison Bashford (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 154-72. Bell argued in her pioneering work on yellow fever in East Africa, it would have been difficult for them to do so since yellow fever did not appear to be the most pressing of medical issues for the colonial authorities in Africa, though they may well have underestimated its impact. 12 Critically, though an effective and largely safe vaccine had been available since 1937, the British colonial authorities (unlike the French) did not attempt any major vaccination campaign in West Africa in this period, except when an epidemic occurred, viewing this as impractical and expensive. 13 The Rockefeller scientists may have been privately critical of this inertia, but by this time the International Health Division of the Rockefeller Foundation had largely withdrawn from public health, making the story of their African involvement very different from those in Central and South America.
14 While they urged the British to increase their investment in medical research in West Africa, and occasionally warned of the danger of a resurgence of yellow fever epidemics, they did not actively advocate for the health of African colonial subjects.
West Africa in the History of Yellow Fever Research
The history of yellow fever in the Americas in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries is, with good reason, a mainstay of history of medicine textbooks. Epidemics of this incurable vector-borne viral dis-12. Heather Bell, Frontiers of Medicine in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, 1899 -1940 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1999 . See Tappan for a different view: Jennifer Tappan, "Endemic Yellow Fever and Immunization in Sub-Saharan Africa" (Rockefeller Archive Center, Research Report, 2014) , http://rockarch.org/publications/resrep/tappan.pdf.
13. Tappan, "Endemic Yellow Fever" (n. 12); Marissa Joanne Chambers, "Responses to Yellow Fever in British West Africa, 1900 " (Ph.D. diss., University of Liverpool, 2000 , quotation on 255.
14. There is an extensive literature on the role of the International Health Division of the Rockefeller Foundation in the history of public health in Central and South America, including work on yellow fever. See Marcos Cueto, "Sanitation from Above: Yellow Fever and Foreign Intervention in Peru, 1919 -22," Hisp. Amer. Hist. Rev. 72, no. 1 (1992 Columbia, 1932 ," Dynamis 24 (2004 ease, probably originating in Africa and assumed to have been carried to the New World in slave trading ships, periodically devastated nonimmune populations in the Americas until the early twentieth century. Yellow fever was a major danger to trade and settlement in the Americas (and, to a lesser extent, Europe) in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; it was implicated in the Haitian Revolution and threatened to destabilize projects of imperialism in Central and South America. The discovery of the mosquito vector responsible for urban yellow fever epidemics (aedes aegypti) and the implementation of highly effective environmental and sanitation measures form part of a narrative of disease "conquest" in which American science and scientists typically play heroic roles. 15 The late nineteenth-century advances in the control of yellow fever were, without a doubt, impressive, notwithstanding the fact that the commonly told account neglected to relate the whole story and, in particular, sidelined the input of non-American actors.
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As vector control proved effective and urban epidemics receded in the Americas, so yellow fever appeared to be a less immediate threat there, and total eradication seemed plausible through control of the insect vector responsible for those epidemics, aedes aegypti. But the early twentieth century was also a time of increasing colonization of many parts of the world by imperial powers and agents of international capitalism. With the development of faster transport links (notably air travel), the possibility that endemic yellow fever might "jump" from one continent to another, causing devastating epidemics, especially in Asia, was the source of increasing anxiety on the part of European imperial powers and the United States after the First World War.
17 It was at this point that the Rockefeller Foundation began its major investment in yellow fever research and control. The coastal regions of West Africa had suffered from large-scale urban epidemics of yellow fever in the late nineteenth century and the early years of the twentieth century, Europeans appeared particularly vulnerable, 15. John R. Pierce and Jim Writer, Yellow Jack: How Yellow Fever Ravaged America and Walter Reed Discovered Its Deadly Secrets (Hoboken: John Wiley, 2005) . On the eradication narrative, see Stepan, Eradication (n. 6 17. In 1951 George K. Strode, director of the International Health Division of the Rockefeller Foundation, summarized the foundation's work on yellow fever and explained the perceived security threat it posed, while conceding that the disease had not, so far, spread to India: George K. Strode et. al., Yellow Fever (n. 11); Bell, Frontiers of Medicine (n. 12), 163-97; Sivaramakrishnan, "Extremely Far, Incredibly Close" (n. 11).
and mortality rates among colonizers were disconcertingly high.
18 From 1916 to 1949 expenditure on research on yellow fever in Africa carried out by the International Health Division of the foundation amounted to around one and a quarter million dollars, but this was only a fraction of a global expenditure of nearly fourteen million dollars.
19 Much of this investment was made in Central and South America. 20 Nevertheless, the foundation's West African yellow fever research in the 1920s and 1930s was highly significant scientifically and achieved considerable fame.
From 1925 until 1934, the foundation, in collaboration with the British colonial authorities, funded the West Africa Yellow Fever Commission with a laboratory in Yaba, near Lagos. 21 As Marisa Chambers has argued, though the foundation initially announced an interest in control work similar to that carried out in Central and South America, this failed to materialize and it soon became clear that West Africa would be the site of research, not public health intervention. 22 This was in line with a more general shift away from public health to research within the International Health Division of the foundation, as described by John Farley. 23 But is also reflects the largely impoverished colonial context of West Africa and prevailing attitudes toward Africans.
24
As a scientific body, the commission achieved fame, for both good and bad reasons. In 1927 its scientists had made a major advance when they identified a susceptible animal that could be used for experimentation-18. On the consequences for urban planning and public health in French West Africa, see Kalala J. Ngalamulume, "Keeping the City Totally Clean: Yellow Fever and the Politics of Prevention in Colonial Saint-Louis- Du-Sénégal, 1850 -1914 ," J. Afr. Hist. 45 (2004 : 183-202; Christian Strother, "'A Danger Which More or Less Threatens Us All': Yellow Fever and the Politics of Disease Control in Senegal, 1890 -1914 ," J. Colonialism Colon. Hist. 15, no. 2 (2014 ): doi:10:1353 /cch.2014 19. This was however only a fraction of global expenditure of nearly fourteen million dollars. Strode et al., Yellow Fever (n. 11). 20. Farley, To Cast Out Disease (n. 6), 88-107; Marcos Cueto, "The Cycles of Eradication: The Rockefeller Foundation and Latin American Public Health, 1918 -1940 ," in International Health Organisations and Movements, 1918 -1939 , ed. Paul Weindling (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995 Stepan, Eradication (n. 6), 77-97. 21. Marisa Joanne Chambers has provided a detailed account of the work of the commission, focusing on the role of the British colonial authorities and their relations with the Rockefeller Foundation: Chambers, "Responses to Yellow Fever" (n. 13); see also Farley, To Cast Out Disease (n. 6 the rhesus monkey. From this point they developed the crucially important "protection test," a method that allowed them to identify individuals who had been exposed to yellow fever in the past and had developed immunity. The test involved injecting a person's serum along with the live virus into a rhesus monkey. If the monkey survived, this demonstrated the "protective" qualities of the human serum; if it died, then it was assumed that the serum conveyed no immunity.
25 By 1931 it had been shown by Max Theiler that this method could be used on mice, and that the virus could then be passed directly from mouse to mouse using intracerebral injections. This discovery greatly expanded the applicability of the protection test but also opened up numerous other experimental avenues. Ultimately it enabled Theiler to produce a vaccine made possible by a Ghanaian named Asibi whose blood had been taken by a member of the commission, Alexander Mahaffy. 26 But the research had also taken its toll on the community of yellow fever scientists. The commission's laboratories had been shown to be mismanaged. A total of six scientists died as a result of accidental infections, and though this was glossed in terms of heroic sacrifice, it was also a story of hubris, especially on the part of one its more famous members, Hideyo Noguchi, who stubbornly adhered to his mistaken theory of a bacterial agent beyond the point at which this appeared plausible.
27
The commission withdrew in 1934. The discovery of endemic, or "jungle" yellow fever in Brazil in 1932 had radically changed the picture of yellow fever epidemiology. The prospect of total eradication receded with the recognition that there might be large areas of the tropics and subtropics where yellow fever was endemic, among human populations, other mammalian populations, or both, and that more than one insect vector might be implicated. As Nancy Stepan argues, by the mid-1930s the Rockefeller scientists had abandoned the dream of yellow fever eradication, which ten years earlier had seemed to be within reach. Total eradication was impossible without destroying the forest habitats and animals that acted as reservoirs of the endemic variety of the disease. On the other hand the possibility of species eradication of the urban vector, 25. Henry Beeuwkes, J. H. Bauer, and A. F. Mahaffy, "Yellow Fever Endemicity in West Africa with Special Reference to Protection Tests," Amer. J. Trop. Med. 10, no. 5 (1930): 305-33. 26. The history of yellow fever vaccine development is a subject in its own right, which I am unable to deal with fully in this article. See Farley, To Cast Out Disease (n. 6), Strode et al., Yellow Fever (n. 11) ; Thomas P. Monath, "Yellow Fever," aedes aegypti, combined with the use of a new and safer vaccine from 1937 implied that the disease might be effectively controlled and major epidemics averted.
28 Scientific interest in "jungle" or "sylvatic" yellow fever, its animal reservoirs and vectors, led the foundation back to Africa, but this time to Uganda where, in 1936, it opened (collaboratively with the British colonial authorities) a Yellow Fever Research Institute at Entebbe and pursued both laboratory and field-based research in forest areas.
29
In 1943, spurred on in part by the perceived danger of the resurgence of epidemic yellow fever in West Africa as a result of the movement of nonimmune Allied personnel, the Rockefeller scientists were back at Yaba in Lagos establishing an ambitious research program collaboratively with the colonial government that lasted until late 1948 and continued in a reduced form beyond that. 30 This was a wartime initiative, framed by the global conflict. The Yellow Fever Research Institute at Yaba had three stated aims. First, it would conduct research into yellow fever in West Africa "in order to determine whether the jungle version of the disease discovered several years ago in South America has a counterpart in West Africa." Second, its laboratory would serve as a distribution center for yellow fever vaccine to troops and "settlements" (i.e., non-African settlements) in West Africa. Third, it would "provide British government units with a consultative service on problems of yellow fever control."
31 Links between the Yaba and Entebbe laboratories were strong, with personnel and material moving constantly between the two and beyond to the central laboratory in New York and to fellow Rockefeller scientists in Central and South America. There was also an uneasy collaboration with the French, whose Pasteur Institute at Dakar developed its own highly ambitious and sometimes controversial program in French African territories. generously funded than most equivalent British colonial institutions and, second, it was an American-run institution within a British colonial setting. Like many enclaves of today's global medical research, it was an island of technological ambition, set within a wider context of medical deprivation. 33 However, the use of sophisticated equipment coexisted with the most basic of techniques, and did not free the scientists from a heavy dependence on the labor of their Nigerian employees. By the late 1940s the compound included a new animal house and laboratory, the latter home to a hoard of expensive imported equipment. The housing for its senior scientists was elaborate; there was a tennis court, carefully tended rose gardens, and plenty of motor vehicles.
34 Not all American "wives" flourished at Yaba, and wartime travel restrictions made the journey to and from the United States unpredictable, so this was a predominantly male environment, as Bugher's more private correspondence with his colleagues reveals. 35 Despite their enclave-like qualities, African spaces of scientific research were and are not pristine experimental spaces. Yaba was no exception. On the one hand, the documentary record emphasizes its apparent isolation from the everyday realities of late colonial Lagos. On the other hand, it was clearly a very porous space, dependent on a constant supply of imported materials, the labor of a large staff of Nigerian personnel, and the provision of blood and other biological material from its surrounding communities and environment. The transgression of the laboratory space was constantly in evidence. As Robert Kohler has argued, the "placelessness" of the laboratory was always a cultural convention.
36
Given the unfortunate earlier history of errors, accidental infections, and deaths, when the Rockefeller scientists returned to Yaba in 1943 it must have seemed incumbent on them to demonstrate that they could run a laboratory in Africa safely and responsibly. This task fell largely on the man who in 1943 was appointed director of the Yellow Fever Research Institute at Yaba, Dr. John Bugher. 37 Bugher, born in Indiana in 1901, had taught bacteriology and pathology at the University of Michigan before joining the foundation's field staff in 1937. He had worked extensively on 34. John Bugher was a keen amateur filmmaker. Views of the Yaba compound, as well as the work of the laboratory, can be seen in his collection of audiovisual material: YFRI Nigeria, box 1, DVD AV840, series 7, Audio-Visual Material, John Bugher Papers, FA027, RF, RAC (hereafter Bugher Papers).
35. Though generally reserved and proper in his correspondence with the foundation, Bugher's Papers also contain jokey letters from his colleagues, replete with sexual innuendo and some dubious poetry: Correspondence, 1945-48, f 7, box 1, subseries 1, series 1, Bugher Papers.
36. Robert E. Kohler, "Labscapes: Naturalizing the Lab," Hist. Sci. 40, no. 4 (2002) One of Bugher's first tasks was to set up an efficient mouse colony, vital to the work of the laboratory that he was reestablishing. When the commission scientists had packed their bags in 1934, they had left behind them the vestiges of a mouse colony, which had been haphazardly maintained by colonial personnel. The mice now exhibited an unacceptably high degree of variability in terms of their susceptibility. Housing and feeding the mice adequately was vital to their use as experimental and breeding animals, and preoccupied Bugher in the first couple of years. The mice also required imported wheat germ and oats for their diet. Refrigeration was required for the mouse supplies, and ceiling fans were needed for the mice themselves. Caring for the mice was largely the task of Nigerian employees. These men (and, briefly it seems, one woman) were listed in the YFRI's annual reports by name as "Animal attendants," a title that was certainly an improvement on the earlier references to "mouse boys," but which nevertheless understated their role. 40 Aside from the mundane but exacting tasks of feeding the mice and keeping them healthy, these attendants (as the photographic evidence makes clear) also performed skilled operations including injecting mice brains. When some of these attendants joined a one-day strike of public workers in 1945 (the only mention of Nigerian political activity in the Rockefeller archive of the YFRI at a time of considerable political ferment), two of the wives of American scientists, Mrs. Bugher and Mrs. Jones, were drafted in to "save" the colony. 41 Then as now, scientific research carried out by external agencies in 38. The process of reestablishing the Yaba compound and negotiating with the British colonial authorities can be followed in John Bugher's officer's diary, Alexander Mahaffy's diary, and their correspondence with the foundation: John C. Bugher Officer's Diary, box 55, RG 12, FA391, RF, RAC; John C Bugher diary entries in f 10, box 1, subseries 1, series 1, box 1, Bugher Papers; Alexander Mahaffy diary entries, Alexander Mahaffy Officer's Diary, box 274, RG 12, FA391, RF, RAC.
39. Mahaffy was director of the Yellow Fever Research Institute in Entebbe and a key figure in the history of yellow fever research.
40. The pioneering sleeping sickness researcher Louise Pearce was funded by the Rockefeller Foundation to investigate the disease in the Belgian Congo in the early 1920s. In her papers she describes the trials of establishing an experimental mouse colony and the work of the "mouse boys." The latter were frequently accused of stealing the animal food for their own consumption. Louise Pearce Papers, FA188, RF, RAC. Africa depended heavily on the skills and commitment of local workers, who were rarely accorded the status of scientists themselves. 42 The relentless routine of the mouse colony was absolutely central to the work of the institutes, both at Yaba and its twin establishment in Entebbe. It was exacting work. Not only were mice employed in epidemiological work (the "protection tests"), but mice titrations were also used to ensure the quality of the vaccine that the institute was responsible for distributing in the region to Allied troops, and for the development of a new scratch vaccine. 43 What this actually meant in terms of laboratory practice can be glimpsed from John Bugher's report for 1948 in which he described the processes in detail: the incubation and injection of chicken embryos with viral material, the removal and grinding of embryos in a homogenizer, the pipetting into glass containers, before culturing and titration. This was a process repeated, but with additional elements, to test the "combined vaccine" using sheep lymph. Once produced in the laboratory, these vaccines were tested on both animal and humans subjects and their blood samples analyzed in the Yaba laboratory. 44 Yellow fever epidemiology demanded work on all aspects of the disease cycle. In addition to the mouse colony, and the laboratory for vaccine development and protection tests, Yaba maintained an animal house and mosquito colonies. Though the employment of expatriate "wives" was to become a source of friction between John Bugher and the local colonial authorities, who were under pressure to train more Nigerian staff, Mrs. Marjorie Taylor, the wife of a British science schoolteacher working in Lagos, was for some time employed as a zoologist and took over the supervision of the animal experiments. Primatology, as Donna Haraway has argued, is a highly gendered and racialized science. 45 By the late 1940s, photographs of animals began to feature in the Yaba annual reports. In the 1947 report a full-frontal portrait of "Lulu" a captive chimpanzee occupied pride of 42 place. 46 Lulu was apparently one of Yaba's favorite residents and was frequently photographed in the arms of Mrs. Taylor (Figure 2) .
In their mosquito studies, the Rockefeller scientists at Yaba combined the use of highly sophisticated equipment with the most basic of laborintensive techniques. The photographic archive for yellow fever in Africa, including that for Yaba, is littered with pictures of men (both African and white men) in shorts sitting and staring intently at the bare skin of their legs (Figure 3) . The captions read "Catching mosquitoes."
47 Mosquito catching also took place on a larger scale at field sites, as I describe in the next section. Since the discovery that yellow fever could be transmitted by mosquito vectors other than aedes aegpyti, the study of the habits of a range of species, including their habitats, their flying and feeding habits, and their interactions with human and other animal hosts, was an essential part of the African yellow fever research. The mosquito research took place both in the field and in the laboratory. One of Bugher's aims was to be able to transmit the yellow fever virus from mosquito to mosquito without intermediary or use of monkeys. Colonies of mosquitoes were created in the laboratory and forcibly fed with suspensions of the virus derived from guinea pig blood. To ascertain whether the mosquitoes had successfully infected each other mice were injected intracerebrally with titrated mosquito. 48 Nigerian assistants worked on the mosquito colonies under the supervision of the entomologist.
If much of the laboratory work was necessarily mundane, Bugher's enthusiasm for the latest technologies ensured that this was combined with cutting-edge methods entailing the importation of expensive equipment. Bugher introduced to Yaba two sets of new techniques to aid the study of mosquito vectors. The first was the use of radioactive isotopes to mark and track mosquitoes in the field, which I discuss in the next section. The second was the use of sound equipment in the laboratory. On leave in the United States, Bugher had made contact with Dr. Kahn of Cornell University who had devised a system whereby mosquitoes could be observed and their distinctive sounds recorded "without the observer intruding his presence." In 1948 he imported a soundproof chamber, within which a mosquito cage was suspended along with a microphone in a cable and recording equipment. Climatic conditions within the chamber could be manipulated to mimic real environmental circumstances. This was a case of bringing the environment into the laboratory and the obverse of the "experimental hut" described by Ann H. Kelly in her work on present-day malaria studies in Africa. 49 The sound system recorded a range of mosquito sounds, from the fluttering of their wings to the mating sounds of male and female, enabling a detailed study of behavior in captivity.
The work of the yellow fever scientists was both myopic and expansive, a point also made by Heather Bell in her research on Sudan.
50 At times their single-minded and technocratic pursuit of the hidden "secrets" of the yellow fever virus appears extreme and frankly bizarre. But the nature of yellow fever epidemiology also constantly drove them beyond the laboratory to a more wide-ranging appreciation of environment and ecology.
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The scientists knew that field-based research was key to any significant advances they might make. The central "puzzle" of yellow fever in Africa centered on its endemic form-so-called "jungle fever." Both in South America and in the Entebbe institute (established in 1936), Rockefellerfunded researchers had elaborated techniques to study yellow fever transmission in forest areas and among rural populations. The Entebbebased scientists (led by Alexander Mahaffy, formerly of the West African Commission, and now famous for his role in the identification of the Zika virus), responding initially to an outbreak of unknown fever among road workers in the Bwamba area, had set up a semipermanent field station there, where they conducted exhaustive entomological, zoological, and epidemiological research. Soon after establishing their laboratory and animal facilities, the Yaba scientists also began field research and were searching for a field site equivalent to that at Bwamba.
Blood, Mosquitoes, and the Creation of the "Field"
The "field" for the Yaba scientists was in fact a set of overlapping scientific spaces. First, there was the "field" of research into the past and current extent of yellow fever infection in West Africa. Second, there was the "field" of experimentation with new vaccines, and third, there was the "field" of ecosystems. Endemic "jungle yellow fever" was presumed to exist in West Africa, but its existence had yet to be proven. would necessitate a combination of animal studies including immunity studies similar to those carried out on human populations, and susceptibility studies involving the trapping of animals and attempting to infect them with yellow fever virus. Insect studies in the field would also be essential to understand the range of mosquito vectors involved and their relationship to both human and other mammal populations. The studies of the behavior of yellow fever virus in laboratory mosquitoes needed to be correlated with field-based evidence for transmission. Mosquitoes, it was apparent, behaved differently in captivity.
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Building on the earlier work of the commission, the scientists set about mapping the distribution of yellow fever in West Africa. Though thought to be extensively present, the virus was also infuriatingly elusive. The colonial medical authorities had been instructed to report any suspicious outbreak of disease to the institute, but everyone was well aware that reporting alone would never be sufficient. The second method, which had been employed effectively (but not uncontroversially) by Rockefeller researchers in Central and South America, and experimented with in Uganda and the Belgian Congo, was viscerotomy. 53 Viscerotomy entailed the extraction and testing of liver tissue from "fresh" corpses. Bugher regarded it as essential for accumulating knowledge on the current incidence of yellow fever, but there had been earlier attempts to set up a viscerotomy service in West Africa, which appear to have failed. 54 The obstacle, Bugher discovered from talking to British officials and to Alexander Mahaffy, who had been part of the earlier commission, was "not native resentment," but "administrative," that is, finding out about deaths before burials had taken place. 55 the country. The Rockefeller scientists reported that local medical officers were "sceptical but cooperative." No reports of major "native resistance" reached the Rockefeller scientists, and at the end of the experiment they concluded that it was indeed the lack of close administrative supervision of deaths that made the use of viscerotomy impractical.
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If viscerotomy was impracticable, this was apparently not the case with the "protection test," which became the central tool of yellow fever epidemiological research and, along with vaccine trials, entailed the creation of experimental communities. The creation of such communities and the ethics of bioscientific experimentation are central themes in recent literature on global health in Africa. These sites have been described as "states of exception" in which the scientists (especially those involved in large drug trials) are often very far removed from clinical engagements. These characteristics have in turn been linked to the privatization of previously publicly run services in Africa over the past few decades and to the dominance of vertical, disease-specific research.
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The area around Yaba had been an experimental site for the yellow fever researchers on and off since the mid-1920s. 58 As soon as the laboratory reopened in 1943 they began collecting blood from local schoolchildren and testing it for immunity. Samples from children were especially valuable for the "protection tests" since through them the scientists could date recent outbreaks (or "passages" as they sometimes put it) of the disease. This practice was extended to other parts of West Africa, in an attempt to generate a map of yellow fever incidence and immunity. As John Bugher explained, particular attention was given to children under the age of fifteen, as this enabled them to track recent possible outbreaks of yellow fever, and also ensured continuity with earlier studies of yellow fever in Nigeria. 59 Some of the samples were obtained directly from school- children at Lagos School Clinic, and others were provided "through the kindness" of medical officers in Ilorin and Jos Plateau. (See Figure 4 .)
The scientists did not spend much time worrying about the ethics of these procedures, though they did sometimes place the word "volunteer" in quotation marks in their correspondence. They were privately critical of what they regarded as the excessive caution of British colonial officials when it came to experimentation on African subjects. In the area of vaccine development they regarded themselves as manifestly more responsible that the French, whose mass vaccination program in French West Africa had been criticized as unsafe. 60 They prided themselves on their safety record. However, as John Farley has pointed out, the occurrence in 1942 of jaundice outbreaks among Allied troops resulting from yellow fever vaccination had come as a "slap in the face" for the Health Division of the Rockefeller Foundation and produced a degree of caution all round. 61 There is no evidence from the Yaba archive of any major iatrogenic incident, though this cannot be completely ruled out. 62 Unlike the sleeping sickness vaccine program in Cameroon described by Lachenal, the Rockefeller scientists in West Africa did not administer a useless vaccine to large numbers of people under dangerous conditions, and neither did they work with an explicitly racial theory of disease.
63 Nevertheless, the research relied, implicitly and sometimes explicitly, on a degree of coercion that most of us would find unacceptable. Undoubtedly some people gave blood willingly, but children and leprosy patients had little choice but to cooperate. Others did so on the instructions of local chiefly authorities, who in turn took instructions from the British colonial authorities.
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The "field" was also a field of entomology, which once again relied on the considerable input of Nigerian labor. In 1945, the British entomologist P. F. Mattingly, who was seconded from the colonial medical service, began a detailed study of mosquito species, their habits, and their distribution 60. However, Myron Echenberg argues that the "aggressive application" of the French vaccine by French colonial officials "saved more lives than did the much more passive British colonial approach to yellow fever": Echenberg, "'For Their Own Good'" (n. 32).
61. John Farley, To Cast Out Disease (n. 6), 179. 62. For a major example of this, see Anne-Marie Moulin, "Defenseless Bodies and Violent Attitudes in a Global World: Blood Iatrogenesis and Hepatitis C Transmission in Egypt," in Giles-Vernick and Webb, Global Health in Africa (n. 1), 138-58.
63. Lachenal, Le medicament (n. 1). The Rockefeller scientists did believe that Africans generally experienced yellow fever as a "mild" disease and this was almost certainly an overgeneralization. However, they did not subscribe to theories of racially inherited susceptibility or resistance.
64. For an examination of similar practices in East Africa and their local meanings, see Graboyes, Experiment Must Continue (n. 1), 75-76. at a field station on the Ogun River. Using a technique perfected by his colleagues in Uganda, particularly the indefatigable Alexander Haddow, 65 Mattingly had erected a series of platforms at different heights on which were stationed trained Nigerian assistants working in pairs, whose job it was to catch mosquitoes ( Figure 5 ). Over thirty thousand mosquitoes, composed of more than fifty species, were caught and their biting cycles and vertical distributions studied. 66 As these figures indicate, this was a remarkably labor-intensive and exacting enterprise.
The labor intensity of mosquito catching was, however, combined at Yaba with the most innovative and cutting-edge of techniques. Around the same time as he had become aware of Kahn's "mosquito sound" studies, Bugher also heard of the possibility of using radioactive isotopes to mark mosquitoes and track them in the field. This technique would allow for more accurate mosquito tracking, though it did not do away with the laborious task of catching them. 67 In 1947, having sought advice while on leave in the United States, Bugher, backed by his colleagues in New York, set about obtaining permission to import the radioactive material from the United States and to have it transported, along with a Geiger counter, safely to Nigeria. He then began a series of experiments in the marking of mosquito larvae in the laboratory at Yaba, followed by further experiments releasing the mosquitoes in the field. 68 The Ogbomosho Epidemic: A "Natural Experiment"
The Yaba-based researchers were saved by an epidemic, which acted for them as a "natural experiment." The absence of active clinical cases among Africans had been a major impediment to their work. Yellow fever in West Africa, as in Uganda, was a kind of "present absence," its "passages" through populations could be seen through the protection tests, but actual cases remained elusive. In April 1946 came the news that a Syrian trader, Mr. S. Shaar, hospitalized in Lagos, had been suffering from yellow fever. An interview with Shaar revealed that he had most likely been infected in Ogbomosho (now Ogbomoso), a densely populated city of about a hundred thousand people in southwest Nigeria around thirty miles from the railway connecting Ibadan and Ilorin. Ogbomosho was not unknown to the earlier generation of Rockefeller scientists conducting work on urban yellow fever. Henry Hanson's diary mentions a visit there in 1927. 69 Further research was carried out in the town in the early 1930s, and in 1937 there had been two European cases of yellow fever reported from there. 70 At Yaba this news was greeted with excitement, and Bugher immediately went into action preparing a major case-finding and research expedition, equipping a mobile laboratory, including a few boxes of mice. The expedition team included Bugher himself, who would work in the clinical and epidemiological studies with Drs. Hahn and Macnamara; the entomologist (Mattingly), the zoologist (Marjorie Taylor), and Mr. J. E. Knight, who would supervise the laboratory work. Mrs. Knight was placed in charge of organizing and supervising the practicalities of the expedition and its camp. Twenty unnamed African staff also took part in the expedition, including Bugher's cook, two chauffeurs, a carpenter, eight "mosquito boys," four "animal boys," four animal trappers, one laboratory assistant, two house stewards, and one laundryman. 71 Bugher's plan was to study all aspects of yellow fever epidemiology in Ogbomosho, but the primary aim was to identify actual cases in Africans and isolate strains of the virus from them.
Ogbomosho was described a "native city." It had no resident British administrator and was run through the native authority system typical of British rule-by a chief, who oversaw around one hundred village headmen. The majority of the city's densely packed population were agriculturalists who moved constantly between the city and their fields, within a radius of around fifteen miles and also engaged very actively in trade (as Mr. Shaar's presence there had indicated). Bugher estimated that if you took this mobility into account, the population potentially affected by an outbreak of disease in the town was very much larger than the estimated population of a hundred thousand-more like a million people. Despite its size, Ogbomosho had no government medical officer, but it was home to a leprosy asylum (which still exists) and a Baptist Mission Hospital. 72 As was immediately apparent to the team, the environmental conditions in the city were highly conducive to mosquito-borne diseases. The population took its water supply from a small reservoir, greatly depleted owing to a recent drought, and stored it in water pots in the compounds. There was also a dyeing industry in the city, and the dye pits acted as breeding grounds for mosquitoes. The mosquito implicated in urban yellow fever, aedes aegypti, was everywhere. Unsurprisingly, malaria was common. Indeed, before any cases of yellow fever were found, it was apparent that a malaria epidemic was in full swing.
Earlier yellow fever scientists had often remarked that when the disease attacked Africans its effects were often mild and transient and indistinguishable from other fevers. The Rockefeller scientists did not subscribe to the view (which had long been associated with the Atlantic slavery) that Africans were immune to the disease. 73 Though they very occasionally speculated on genetic adaptation, their methods, particularly the "protection test," were based on the assumption that African populations were susceptible to yellow fever infection. The results of these "protection" surveys, which showed that in some specific geographical areas (and certainly not everywhere) a significant proportion of the population could have been infected in the past and survived, appeared to demonstrate that mortality rates for Africans were indeed lower than they appeared to be for non-Africans. But they were cautious in interpreting these results, noting that most deaths went unrecorded, and that disease surveillance was extremely rudimentary. Indeed, as Jennifer Tappan has argued, the maps of immunity could also be read as maps of susceptibility, demonstrating that in some areas rates of protection against the disease were very low. 74 However, when compared to the widespread effects of malaria, and with high mortality from other infectious diseases (including smallpox, cerebrospinal meningitis, and, later, polio), the immediate threat posed by yellow fever to African populations appeared to some British medical officers to be minimal. The Ogbomosho epidemic presented an opportunity for the Rockefeller scientists to demonstrate that the threat of urban epidemics, such as had been experienced on the coast in earlier decades, was still real.
The immediate reaction of the Ogbomosho population and its leadership was frankly skeptical. Bugher reported that "early in the investigation it became apparent that the native inhabitants did not know that there was an epidemic among them, nor were they interested."
75 Part of this "lack of interest" might be explained by suspicion of the scientists' motives. Their arrival in a cavalcade with their mobile laboratory had entailed large-scale "bleedings" and was followed by an increased presence of the colonial authorities who set about instituting emergency measures, including DDT spraying, emptying water pots, and preventing movement in and out of the town. Bugher's team initially found some difficulty identifying casesthe epidemic was proceeding unnoticed. Eventually, with the cooperation of schoolteachers, they worked backward from pupil absentee records, visiting sick schoolchildren (or those who had recovered) in their homes and taking blood samples from them and from family members. Daily visits were made to suspected yellow fever cases, and severely ill people were taken to the Baptist Mission Hospital, where autopsies were also performed. Eventually, seventy-five cases were positively identified by blood tests, including nine deaths, though Bugher later estimated that the overall mortality rate was probably less that 1 percent. Bugher believed that in 74. Tappan, "Endemic Yellow Fever" (n. 12). 75. YFRI Yaba, Semi-Annual Report, January-June 1946, f 62, box 6, subseries 1, series 1, Bugher Papers. all there might have been as many as five thousand cases altogether, but observations seemed to confirm that yellow fever was a "milder disease" in Africans, and that in some cases none of the classical signs of yellow fever were present. Bugher concluded that yellow fever in Africa is "an acute febrile disease distinguished by its high variability and high proportion of mild cases. . . . Convalescence is typically rapid and complete, especially among children." 76 The epidemic had provided a unique research opportunity. Thirty-four strains of the virus had been isolated from patients and immunological studies conducted on primates. The virus had also been extracted from aedes aegypti mosquitoes and from monkeys hunted in the region. Detailed patient case histories had been collected. Liver samples had been taken for analysis at Yaba. Over sixty thousand people were vaccinated against the disease, and in subsequent years extensive vaccine trials were carried out in Ogbomosho, including on the semicaptive population of leprosy patients in the Ogbomosho asylum.
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Ogbomosho had constituted one kind of experimental setting. The identification of the epidemic had allowed Bugher and his colleagues to examine the various aspects of urban yellow fever epidemiology in real time, in contrast to the "protection tests" that were a constant and tantalizing reminder that they had missed previous outbreaks. Furthermore, the strains isolated from the Ogbomosho patients could be used in the ongoing work of vaccine development.
With its relatively low mortality rate, Ogbomosho could hardly be called a "classic" case of an urban yellow fever epidemic as described in the tropical diseases textbooks. Nevertheless, its epidemiology appears to have been relatively straightforward. The more complex epidemiology of "jungle yellow fever" was still incompletely understood. For this, another kind of experimental fieldwork space was called for. If it did not exist, it had to be created. to be controversial. He drew on the lessons of his colleagues in Uganda. Though they appeared to have found an ideal location for the study of "jungle" yellow fever in the Bwamba forest, the work was long and painstaking and had produced only one human case in six years of intensive research. Writing in his diary during a visit to Entebbe in 1945, Bugher argued that in order to advance the research a forest site should be identified in West Africa into which the yellow fever virus could be artificially introduced into the nonhuman mammal population and its subsequent spread monitored. This would allow a "shortcut" to understanding the entire cycle of sylvan yellow fever, an experiment that could be completed in weeks rather than the years that seemed to be required in natural circumstances. There was one obvious possible objection to this plan. The scientists would be introducing yellow fever to an area and to a human population that had quite possibly never experienced it before and the "administration would be horrified at the prospect of turning yellow fever loose under any circumstances." 79 Bugher planned, however, to control those "circumstances" as far as possible. They would identify an isolated area of low population density where human mobility could be easily monitored and they would vaccinate the entire population before introducing the virus into the forest canopy through caged rhesus monkeys. In fact, this protective measure also had an experimental dimension as Bugher intended to use the opportunity to test a new scratch vaccine grown in chick embryos under field conditions.
After exploring possible sites in Nigeria and elsewhere, eventually a location was found for such an experiment in the British Cameroons. The requirements for such an experiment were exacting. The area had to be forested and to harbor an abundant animal and insect (especially mosquito) population; it should have a low human population density and be relatively isolated from travel routes. Kumba, in southwestern Cameroon, is a town (now a major trading hub) on the edge of a forested extinct volcano. The Rockefeller team selected a site near the volcano, with a population of around four thousand people. Initial "protection" surveys indicated that previous exposure to yellow fever was low (around 10 percent) and therefore that a mass vaccination program, using the new 17D scratch vaccine, would have to take place in advance of the experiment. Against possible objections that the team was introducing yellow fever into an area that had previously had little or no experience of it, Bugher could argue that since there was proof, from an earlier survey, of yellow fever 79. John C. Bugher diary entry for January 24 to February 5, f 1943-47, box 55, RG 12, FA392 , RF, RAC; "Studies in the Cameroons," f 12, box 1, subseries 1, series 1, Bugher Papers. infection in "the general area" among the monkey population, "nothing new was being introduced which was not already in the region."
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In December 1947 preparations for the field study began. A van, a Jeep, and Dr. Bugher's car were shipped to Victoria (the port of British Cameroon) in advance of the arrival of the staff (which included Nigerian personnel) by air and road. The equipment list was extensive, including material for taking blood samples and for separating sera; sealed ampoules for the latter; materials for the preparation of skins and skulls; entomological collecting supplies; microscopes, slides, stains, a portable dry heat sterilizer, a small autoclave, hand centrifuges, and pressure filters for the monkey sera; plus tents and supplies. In June, having settled on a site within the Kumba crater, the team began by vaccinating the entire population within a five-mile radius after preinoculation samples had been taken from a subgroup of two hundred people. A laboratory was set up in a shed at the local hospital, an electric plant installed to run the refrigerator. The five rhesus monkeys and six hundred mice arrived by sea and were trucked up to the site. One of the monkeys was inoculated with a Nigerian strain of yellow fever (but not without some difficulty) and placed on a platform hoisted into the forest canopy. The monkey was bled daily to ensure that it was still infected with the virus. After a couple of weeks, the next stage of the experiment began. Mosquitoes were to be collected in the area, ground down, and inoculated into mice. Subsequently, a sample of local monkeys would be shot to ascertain whether any of them had been infected.
The fieldwork did not go smoothly. The first inoculated rhesus monkey placed in the forest canopy failed to fall sick and had to be replaced by a second one, which appeared to have been highly infectious before dying. But as the entomological work began, a significant and unanticipated problem arose-the scarcity of mosquitoes. Bugher and his colleagues concluded that they needed many more mosquito catchers under these circumstances and made an arrangement with the local Catholic Mission School for fifty volunteer schoolboys (all vaccinated) to help with the night catches. Even with this apparently enthusiastic assistance, only nine specimens of A. Africanus (the mosquito thought to be implicated in transmission in this area) were recovered from a total of 701 man-hours of catching. These were ground down and inoculated into mice, but no trace of yellow fever virus was found. Animal trapping was continued and twenty monkeys were shot around the lake, but ultimately it became clear that the experiment had failed to infect the animal population. Bugher concluded that this was due to the peculiarity of the mosquito population in the Kumba area. More positively, the program of vaccination using the new vaccine had yielded an immunization rate of 92.3 percent, with no adverse clinical reactions.
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It was deeply ironic that, in a region plagued by mosquito-borne disease, in this experimental setting the mosquitoes refused to cooperate. In a later publication, Bugher used the failed Cameroonian field experiment to reflect on the complexity of "jungle" yellow fever epidemiology and on scientific methods. 82 In his correspondence with the foundation, he remarked that "a lot of hard work went into that experiment-one thing we learned was that so-called bacteriological warfare is not so easy." 83 He would have reason to reconsider these words.
African Virus Research and the Cold War
In 1949 the Rockefeller Foundation withdrew its scientists from the Yellow Fever Virus Research Institute at Yaba and handed the facility over to the British colonial authorities. In theory, the institute had always been a joint enterprise, but the Americans had long complained that the British contribution was inadequate, and that British bureaucracy was cumbersome. The colonial authorities in Nigeria seemed, to the Americans, to be paralyzed by anxieties associated with decolonization. Bugher complained that it was no longer possible to recruit British women (including wives of local colonial officials) to certain roles without first demonstrating that there were no Nigerians suitable for these posts. 84 More generally, the Rockefeller Foundation appeared to have concluded that their ambitious field research program on yellow fever in Africa and South America at Yaba had run its course. 85 The Yaba scientists could certainly claim that their vaccine research had made a major contribution to the development of a safe and effective vaccine. The extensive "protection" test surveys appeared to confirm that yellow fever was active as a human disease in parts of West Africa, and that there was more than one variant of "jungle" yellow fever in Africa. Ogbomosho had also demonstrated that urban yellow fever was still a threat. Indeed, in his rather belated plea to the Americans to stay at Yaba, the British colonial secretary, Arthur Creech-Jones, cited the Ogbomosho epidemic. 86 However, the relatively low mortality rate made it hard to argue that yellow fever was a priority in terms of African health. 87 The extensive and expensive research on "jungle" yellow fever seemed to have resulted in the conclusion that this variety of yellow fever was much less common in West Africa than it was in South America, and, though there was always a danger of yellow fever spreading from forest reservoirs to human populations, that had been mitigated by the development of the vaccine. As the annual report of the International Health Division of the foundation put it in 1950, "It is not a dead foe; it is only a dormant one. The price of freedom from yellow fever is constant vigilance." 88 The fact that the British colonial authorities never implemented a widespread vaccination program was, of course, a major weakness.
The failure of the Kumba experiment was a disappointment to Bugher. Virus research, however, was still a hot topic, and the knowledge gained from the extensive African research was important to the wider field. In 1949 Bugher wound down the laboratory at Yaba, handing its facilities over to the colonial authorities, and moved to a position in the International Health Division laboratories at the Rockefeller Institute in New York where he would continue to investigate "new viruses."
89 He took two hundred mice with him. However this was far from being a final ending of Rockefeller involvement in yellow fever research in West Africa, as Thomas P. Monath has shown.
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In Bugher's papers an undated document, authored by him and titled "A Wartime Scientific Programme for the International Health Division," refers to the circumstances of the "resurgence" of "open warfare," presumably alluding to the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, and the new role this implied for the IHD. 91 The threat of biological warfare utilizing viruses among other agents had been raised in the Second World War when the Japanese used toxins in their Chinese campaigns. A U.S. biological warfare program began in 1941 and expanded after the war. 92 Bugher advocated a program that would be both of "immediate military value in either defense or offense," and of "lasting value to science." Specifically, he suggested that the program concentrate on research into virus and rickettsial diseases (including yellow fever), and an evaluation of the potential of a range of viruses for "effective employment" in biological warfare. The potential relevance of the foundation's earlier Africa-based research was clear in this document, including the reference to the importance of establishing the natural vectors of significant viruses and the use of radioactive tagging.
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By 1950, Bugher's expertise in the use of isotopes (and possibly his viral research) also came to the attention of Shields Warren, the director of the Division of Biology and Medicine at the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. In December 1950, Shields Warren wrote to the director of the IHD, George Strode, to say that the Atomic Energy Commission required Bugher's expertise and asked if Bugher could be released from IHD employment for at least two years to work as deputy director of the Division of Biology and Medicine. Strode initially resisted, arguing (somewhat disingenuously) that it did not appear to him that Bugher had expertise appropriate for this role, and that his virus research made him virtually irreplaceable to the IHD. 94 Presumably Bugher was keen to assume this new position. Strode relented and in March 1951 Bugher moved to be deputy director of the Division of Biology and Medicine at the AEC, becoming its director in 1952.
This was a period in the United States of heightened anxiety about biological warfare, and even before taking over the role at Atomic Energy Commission, Bugher had addressed Civilian Protection Groups on "General Considerations on the Use of Infectious Agents as Weapons." 95 Bugher argued that the objective of using such a weapon would not necessarily be that of "wholesale destruction" and "mass slaughter," since this might result in the victor being left with the burden of a "paralysed" enemy. The real potential of biological weapons lay in their ability to "incapacitate the enemy temporarily" and to "induce the enemy to expend essential energy and war potential in useless activity."
As Bugher had discovered in the Cameroons, yellow fever was not the easiest disease to weaponize. In a 2005 roundtable, yellow fever expert Thomas Monath claimed that "we did weaponise yellow fever in the United States," but that the program had not gone far. 96 In the AEC Bugher worked on testing fission and thermonuclear devices and became an expert on the biological consequences of fallout. He ended his career as director of the Nuclear Center of the University of Puerto Rico, from 1960 Rico, from to 1969 Yellow Fever Resurgent While researchers in Africa in the 1930s and 1940s were frequently exasperated by a lack of clinical cases to study, the following decades saw major epidemics in both East and West Africa, including Nigeria. In 1950-52 there were a reported twelve thousand cases in Onitsha Province and another epidemic on Jos Plateau caused five to six hundred deaths. By the mid-1950s, scientists from the Yaba institute, now run by the British colonial authorities, had built up a more complex picture of the pattern of endemicity and susceptibility to epidemics in different parts of Nigeria, and the different vectors involved. In the rain forest belt of South and Southwest Nigeria, where villages were interspersed with forest, they found that the disease was endemic in both human and monkey populations, and that over 70 percent of the population had become immune by the age of ten years. However, epidemics did occur in towns (including Ogbomosho) that were in the "transitional belt" between forest and savannah. In densely populated Eastern Nigeria, where most of the forest had disappeared, human populations were largely nonimmune and epidemics occurred, though the mortality rates experienced during these events varied markedly. In Northern Nigeria, where the disease was neither endemic nor epizootic, epidemics occurred rarely and could usually be traced to an infected traveler entering the region from the south.
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The 1960s saw further major outbreaks in Africa, including a devastating epidemic in Ethiopia with an estimated thirty thousand deaths. In 1969 there was a region-wide epidemic across West Africa. The ending of the mass compulsory vaccination scheme in the former French colonies of West Africa made large populations vulnerable and resulted in a resurgence of epidemic disease in these regions. During an attempt to control one such epidemic in Senegal in 1965, a major iatrogenic outbreak of postvaccinal encephalitis occurred.
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Despite its formal withdrawal from Yaba, the Rockefeller Foundation remained heavily involved in research in Africa into yellow fever and related viruses, among which are West Nile Fever and Zika, both of which have demonstrated a capacity to travel and transform in new environments. Climate change raises the possibility of further global spread. As in the 1940s, the major impetus for African arbovirus research comes more from global biosecurity concerns than it does from a desire to protect the health of African populations. However, yellow fever itself is now regarded as a major "resurgent" epidemic disease in Africa, where around 90 percent of reported cases occur. The legacy of the work of Bugher and his colleagues in terms of research and medical priorities is not easily summarized. On the one hand, their technocratic enthusiasm and ambitions as international researchers led to them to produce the kinds of research enclaves that we see on the continent today-financed by international agencies, self-contained, and with minimal impact on the health of surrounding populations. On the other hand, their multifaceted research into yellow fever had clearly demonstrated the complexity of viral disease and the necessity to understand all of its human, animal, and environmental aspects. Perhaps this contributed to a skepticism on the question of eradication that, as Nancy Stepan has argued, was typical of approaches to malaria control in Africa even at the height of enthusiasm elsewhere for DDT. 102 Without a better financed and run public health service and economic and social development, research was unlikely to be translated into effective practice, as
